Analysing Wage Formation in the South African Labour Market: The Role of Bargaining Councils by Bhorat, Haroon et al.
Analysing Wage Formation in the 
South African Labour Market: 
The role of Bargaining Councils
DPRU Policy Brief Series
Development Policy Research Unit
School of Economics





Analysing Wage Formation in the South African Labour Market: The role of Bargaining Councils
 2
 1.  Introduction
Bargaining councils – known as industrial councils before 1995 – are the key 
institutions involved in the statutory system of collective bargaining and wage 
determination in the South African labour market. A bargaining council can be 
established by one or more registered trade unions and one or more registered 
employer organisations for a specifi c sector and area. 
Both trade unions and bargaining councils have been accused of contributing 
to labour market infl exibility, and specifi cally wage infl exibility. The extensions of 
wage agreements to non-bargaining council members and non-union members 
are deemed to be problemtatic and it has been argued that these extensions place 
unnecessary burdens on particulary small and new businesses and contribute to 
the high unemployment rate in the country.
The main objective of this study is to evaluate the role of bargaining councils in 
wage formation in the South African labour market. Specifi cally, the study airms 
to determine what premium is associated with bargaining council membership as 
distinct from union membership. 
 2.  Institutionalised Wage Formation: A Brief Overview
In terms of the LRA, a bargaining council may be established by one or more trade 
unions and one or more registered employer organisations. The state can also 
be a party if it is an employer. The legislation regulates the extension of collective 
agreements concluded in a bargaining council. In terms of the LRA, a bargaining 
council can request the Minister of Labour in writing to extend a collective 
agreement to non-parties which fall within its jurisdiction.  
The LRA called for the establishment of a bargaining council for the public services 
as a whole, called the public service co-ordinating bargaining council (PSCBC). 
Before 1994, remuneration in the public sector was set by a commission. No 
formal negotiations took place, but staff associations representing white workers 
in the public service were consulted. The post-apartheid LRA gave the PSCBC 
the authority to designate sectors of the public service for the establishment of a 
sectoral bargaining council. 
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Industrial councils were fi rst created in 1924 as a response to industrial action 
particularly in the mining sector and with the specifi c aim of establishing a system 
of collective bargaining. For most of the period up to 1996, African workers were 
excluded from industrial councils and when they were fi nally allowed to join in 
the 1980’s the established councils were not adequately prepared to deal with 
the interests of African workers. With the advent of democratic rule in 1994, the 
system of industrial relations was incoherent, inconsistent and in many cases still 
racist. The period following the elections was characterised by a frantic process 
of recasting South Africa’s labour regulatory environment. The outcome was a 
signifi cant rewriting of laws, including the Labour Relations Act (LRA) and the Basic 
Conciliations and Employment Act (BCEA). Industrial councils became Bargaining 
Councils under the new legislation with the LRA and BCEA governing bargaining 
councils as well as wage determinations.
As we shall see in the analysis that follows, the PSCBC remains central to the 
understanding of the determinants of wages and wage formation in the post-
apartheid South African labour market. 
 3.  The Nature of Wage Formation in South Africa
  3.1  Ways of Negotiating Wages
Aside from bargaining councils, there are other forums in which centralised 
collective wage bargaining takes place. Apart from non-statutory centralised 
collective bargaining, non-statutory bargaining also takes place at a decentralised 
or single-employer level. 
  3.2  Extensions and Exemptions from Bargaining Council Agreements
The LRA sets out the procedures that have to be followed to have a collective 
agreement extended to non-parties. One of the main crticisms levelled against 
the extension of bargaining council agreements is that large fi rms dominate the 
employer party bargaining. When these agreements are extended to non-parties, 
they affect non-party small businesses. The extension to non-parties was the 
subject of fi erce debate in the mid-1990s in terms of the unintended consequence 
it ostensibly had in increasing regulatory oversight and labour costs for small 
businesses. While it is generally diffi cult to accurately estimate the share of workers 
covered by extensions of bargaining council agreements, Godfrey et al (2006) 
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found that of the estimated 32,6 percent of formally employed workers (excluding 
all managers and professionals in the private sector) covered by bargaining 
councils, only 4,6 percent were covered by extensions to agreements. In other 
words, extended bargaining council agreements covered a very small share of the 
labour force. This initial evidence suggests that the extension to non-parties as a 
source of potential rigidity in the labour market may be overstated. 
Similarly, a study looking at data on exemptions found that by far the majority were 
granted, either in full, partially or conditionally. 
 4.  A Descriptive Approach to Evaluation of a Possible Wage  
 Premium Associated with Membership of an Industrial or  
 Bargaining Council
  4.1  The Level Of Coverage By Bargaining Councils
First the number of workers covered by industrial councils in 1995 and by bargaining 
councils in 2005 had to be estimated. Information from agreements and various 
other sources was used to identify these markers covered by council agreements 
in the 1995 October Household Survey and the 2005 Labour Force Survey.
The authors found that bargaining council agreements, outside of union 
membership, only covered 15 percent of workers in 1995. A decade later, this 
fi gure, although more than doubling, stood at only 32 percent. Put differently, the 
sytem of bargaining councils in South Africa – designed to formalise the relationship 
between organised workers and employers with regard to wages, benefi ts, dispute 
resolution and other aspects of labour market regulation – remains relatively weak 
and unrepresentative at the national level. 
However, a key conclusion is that the 1995-2005 period refl ects a rapid rise in 
the bargaining council system for the public sector. Driven by the formalisation of 
teachers, nurses and other public sector professionals into the PSCBC, this sector 
is now the bedrock for institutionalised bargaining in the labour market. The fl ip 
side of the coin is that bargaining councils within the private sector have at best 
stagnated and at worst are in secular decline. Where there has been signifi cant 
growth, it has been within state-owned enterprise related sectors. 
This poor performance within the private sector alludes to a worrying trend – that 
of the failure to resort to established practices of institutionalised bargaining and 
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dispute resolution within new or fast-growing sectors. This is particularly important 
when those sectors or industries have low levels of unionisation and employers’ 
organisation, as it often provides the seedbed for fractious industrial relations. 
  4.2  Earnings in the Bargaining Council System
At the aggregate level there was no signifi cant remunerative advantage offered 
to being associated with a bargaining council. When the average earnings of 
workers covered by agreements are compared with the earnings of workers 
outside of the bargaining council system. Closer inspection of the mean earnings 
of bargaining council members, however, revealed signifi cant premia associated 
with membership of public sector bargaining councils. Hence, at the aggregate 
level, public sector bargaining council members not only earned more than their 
private sector counterparts, but also on average more than workers who did not 
belong to a bargaining council. This result holds true for males and females, as 
well as Africans and coloureds. The same trend emerges when examining average 
earnings by occupation group. 
5.  Bargaining Council Membership And Wages –   
 A Multivariate Analysis
A wide variety of other variables (including education and experience) also 
infl uence earnings and the objective of the multivariate analysis is to estimate the 
impact of these variables as well as bargaining council coverage on earnings.
The result from the analysis suggest that in 1995, a formal sector worker who 
was a member of both a bargaining council and a union did not enjoy a wage 
premium as a consequence of his membership of the two institutions. However, 
workers covered by a bargaining council agreement but not a union did enjoy a 
wage premium relative to those not covered by a wage agreement. Bargaining 
council members were likely to earn almost seven percent more than those not 
covered by a wage agreement. Membership of a union in 1995 provided a much 
larger wage premium, with workers that belonged to a union, but not a bargaining 
council, enjoying a union wage premium of almost 20 percent. 
Ultimately, this result for 1995 suggests that bargaining councils affected an 
individual’s mean wages only in the absence of union membership. Institutionalised 
wage formation in 1995 was therefore characterised by a strong union-wage effect 
Analysing Wage Formation in the South African Labour Market: The role of Bargaining Councils
 6
and a signifi cant – albeit lower – bargaining council effect. Importantly, the latter 
was only true for those bargaining council members who were not unionised.
The results for 2005 suggest that a formal sector worker covered by a bargaining 
council agreement but not a member of a union, did not enjoy a wage premium 
in 2005. However, union membership on its own is associated with an earnings 
premium of about 17 percent. For workers who were members of bargaining 
councils and unions as well, the results suggest an earnings premium of almost 
16 percent. 
The result was primarily driven by the fact that all non-managers in the public 
sector now belonged to the public service bargaining councils, with a large share 
of these individuals unionised. Membership of a private sector bargaining council 
did not yield any premium, but membership of the public sector bargaining councils 
was associated with a wage premium of 28 percent. 
In both years, workers enjoyed a wage premium associated with their union 
membership, irrespective of bargaining council membership.  
The results from the multivariate analysis confi rm the tentative conclusions from 
the descriptive overview. Wage premiums associated with union membership 
remained strong in both 1995 and 2005. In addition, it is evident that public 
employees that were members of a bargaining council enjoyed high and signifi cant 
returns to their earnings in 2005. 
 
  5.1  Results from Quantile Regressions
When the impact of union membership and bargaining council agreements was 
considered at different points of the wage distribution, it was found that in 1995, 
union membership awarded a wage premium to all workers but this premium was 
highest for the lower skilled and lower paid workers at the bottom of the wage 
distribution.
In 2005, membership of a public service bargaining council offered a wage premium 
of between 18 percent and 34 percent. Again across the wage distribution, this 
public service bargaining council wage premium increased from the 5th percentile 
to the 35th percentile, before declining to the lowest point at the 95th percentile. 
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Again, union membership offered a wage premium across the distribution, with a 
relatively higher premium at the bottom of the distribution. 
In both years, union membership not only awarded wage premia across the wage 
distribution, it also served to reduce wage inequality and particularly so in the 
bottom half of the wage distribution.
 6.  Conclusion
The main objective of the paper is to estimate the wage premium – if any – 
associated with industrial or bargaining council membership in the South Africa 
labour market. As this was done for both 1995 and 2005, it enabled the authors to 
comment on the changing patterns of institutionalised wage formation in the post-
apartheid South Africa. 
Bargaining council membership rose from 15 percent of formally employed 
workers in 1995 to 32 percent in 2005 – meaning that less than a third of the 
formally employed were covered by bargaining councils. The rise in membership 
was driven by the public sector. In the private sector, bargaining councils have 
stagnated or declined between 1995 and 2005. 
While at fi rst glance, bargaining council membership did not appear to be 
associated with wage premia in either 1995 and 2005, closer inspection reveals 
that public sector workers did enjoy signifi cant wage premia. This was the 
conclusion from descriptive analysis as well as the wage premium associated with 
union membership remained strong between1995 and 2005.    
